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ABSTRACT
For a growing number of indications, combination therapies are becoming increasingly
common due in part to their superior efficacy, as compared to monotherapies. In fact, in
the case of infectious diseases such as AIDS and tuberculosis, combination therapies
are now the standard of care. With the emergence of drug-device combinations, genetic
testing, and individualized medicine, this trend towards combination therapies is likely to
continue to grow.
In this context the pricing of combination therapies is a critical component that needs to
be understood by medical practitioners, payors and policy makers. There are three
factors to consider in the pricing of combination therapies: the characteristics and
structure of the market in which the combined product is sold, the absence or presence
of market exclusivity, and the prices of the components of the combined product, when
sold individually. When one or more of the components of the combined product has
market exclusivity, additional factors such as exclusionary bundling, tying, and double
marginalization may come into play.
In this thesis I discuss combination therapies, describe the factors that can affect the
pricing of combination therapies, and then attempt to identify the relationships among
component pricing, market forces, market exclusivity and the pricing of combination
therapies.
To illustrate these relationships empirically, I will analyze data from a sample of unified
combined drugs, a subset of combination therapies.
The results of this analysis are consistent with a hypothesis that, for combination drugs
with a patented ingredient, the elimination of double marginalization by efficient transfer
pricing and economic and exclusionary bundling, lowers the price of the unified
combination drug relative to the price of its constituents.
Thesis Supervisor: Ernst Bemrndt
Title: Professor of Applied Economics
Thesis Co-supervisor: Frank Douglas
Title: Professor of the Practice, Harvard-MIT Division of Health Science and Technology
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CHAPTER 1: COMBINATION THERAPIES
Introduction
For a growing number of indications, combination therapies are becoming increasingly
common' due in part to their superior efficacy, as compared to monotherapies. In fact, in
the case of infectious diseases such as AIDS and tuberculosis, combination therapies
are now the standard of care. With the emergence of drug-device combinations, genetic
testing, and individualized medicine, this trend towards combination therapies is likely to
continue to grow.
In this context the pricing of combination therapies is a critical component that needs to
be understood by medical practitioners, payors and policy makers. There are three
factors to consider in the pricing of combination therapies: the characteristics and
structure of the market in which the combined product is sold, the absence or presence
of market exclusivity, and the prices of the components of the combined product, when
sold individually. When one or more of the components of the combined product has
market exclusivity, additional factors such as exclusionary bundling, tying, and double
marginalization may come into play.
In this thesis I discuss combination therapies, describe the factors that can affect the
pricing of combination therapies, and then attempt to identify the relationships among
component pricing, market forces (which will be defined), market exclusivity and the
pricing of combination therapies.
To illustrate these relationships empirically, I will analyze data from a sample of unified
combined drugs, a subset of combination therapies (which will be elaborated below).
Unified combination therapies
In this thesis, combination therapy refers to the usage of multiple products for a single
treatment. For example, one tablet of aspirin and one tablet of Plavix is the standard of
"Pharmaceutical Industry turns to drug combinations", The Brown University
PsvchoDharmacoloav UDdate, The Brown University Press, 2004
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care for patients who have undergone coronary stent implantation= - this would be an
example of a combination therapy. Unified combination therapy refers to a physically
bundled and inseparable delivery of multiple products. For instance, a single tablet with
multiple active ingredients will be referred to as a unified combination drug. A
combination therapy could be a combination of two or more drugs, a drug and a device,
or a diagnosis and a therapeutic treatment. In the case of a combination of two drugs or
a drug and a device, the products can be made inseparable thus creating a unified
combination product.
Pharmaceutical and device companies have increasingly focused on unified combination
products for a variety of reasons.3 These reasons will be further explored for each of the
different types of combinations.
Combination therapies: Drugs
Clinical benefits of combination drugs
Some combination drugs are more effective against infectious agents
The emergence of drug-resistant strains of infectious agents due to multiple drug-
resistant (MDR) mutations has resulted in the use of a cocktail of antibiotics or antivirals
in the treatment of infectious disease.4 Adding a combination of antibiotics rapidly raises
to astronomical values the number of cell divisions required by bacteria to attain
resistance to the drug. The number of divisions required by tuberculosis to acquire
resistance to one drug is empirically understood to be I 6, while the number of divisions
required for resistance to three drugs would be 1018 an exponentially larger number4. As
a result, combinations are the preferred mode of treatment for AIDS, tuberculosis,
malaria, and other infectious diseases that rapidly gain resistance to monotherapy.
Another use of a combination drug is the bundling of one component that may have no
direct therapeutic effect, but aids the second component in achieving the result, a
2 Daniel M. Kolansky, Bruce D. Klugherz, Sean C. Curran, MD, Howard C. Herrmann, Kathleen
Magness, Robert L. Wilensky, John W. Hirshfeld Jr., Combination Therapy with Clopidogrel and
Aspirin After Coronary Stenting", Catheterization and Cardiovascular Interventions, January 2000.
3 'Pharmaceutical Industry turns to drug combinations", The Brown University
Psvchopharmacoloav Update, The Brown University Press, 2004
4 Albert I Wertheimer, Alan Morrison "Combination Drugs: Innovation in Pharmacotherapy",
Pharmacy & Therapeutics, January 2002, 27 (1) 44:49
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phenomenon called potentiation. For example, clavulanate inhibits bacterial production
of beta-lactamase - an enzyme that degrades amoxicillin. This restores the activity of
amoxicillin against strains that have developed a gene encoding beta-lactamase.
Similarly, carbidopa prevents the inactivation by the human body of levadopa, which is
used to treat Parkinson's disease.5 Combinations can also increase the therapeutic
index, the ratio of the toxic dose to the therapeutic dose, by cancellation - where the
adverse effects of one drug are cancelled by the activity of another component, for
example a combination of a diuretic, which is hypokalemic, with an ACE-inhibitor, which
is hyperkalemic. 5
Combinations of drugs can have fewer side effects than a large dose of a single drug
The side effects of most drugs are generally related to the dosage of the drugs being
used; dose-related adverse reactions - known as augmented reactions - are thought to
be responsible for approximately 80% of adverse drug reactions (ADRs).6 A
combination of drugs may reduce the side effects by lowering the dose of each
component drug below the threshold level that causes the side effects.
In some cases, while a combination of lower doses can result in fewer side effects, the
therapeutic effect on the disease will still be additive, thereby treating the disease
effectively with fewer side effects.
The most cited example of this effect is in the case of antihypertensive drugs, where
combinations of diuretics, ACE inhibitors, and calcium channel blockers are used with
greater efficacy and fewer side effects than a larger dose of any one agent alone.
In fact, in recent clinical trials for hypertension, results show that single drug therapy
seldom achieves the desired blood pressure, while combination therapy is more likely to
achieve the desired result.7
5 Albert I Wertheimer, Alan Morrison "Combination Drugs: Innovation in Pharmacotherapy",
Pharmacy & Therapeutics, January 2002, 27 (1) 44:49
"Adverse drug reactions", National Medicines Information Centre Magazine, 2002;8(3):1-4
Some combination drugs can lower your pill bill", Harvard Heart Letter, June 2004:5
8
ACE inhibitor plus Angiotensin-receptor Beta blocker plus Statin plus extended-
thiazide diuretic blocker plus thiazide diuretic release niacin
Accuretic thiazidle diuretic Corzide Advicor
Capozide Atacand HCT Inderide Statin plus calcium-
Lotensin HCT Avalide Inderide LA channel blocker
Monopril HCT Benicar HCT Lopressor HCT Caduet
Prinzide Diovan HCT Tenoretic
Uniretic Hyzaar Timolide Diabetes
Vaseretic Micardis HCT Ziac combinations
Zestoretic Teveten HCT GlucovanceACE inhibitor plus Avandamet
Aspirin plus Thiazide diuretic plus calcium-channel Metaglip
dipyridamole (an potassium-sparing blocker
antiplatelel agent) diuretic Lotrel
Aggrenox Dyazide
Figure 1: Cardiovascular Combination drugs from Combination Drugs: Innovation in
Pharmacotherapy, Wertheimer and Morrison8
There are, however, other classes of drugs where this logic does not hold. For example,
in the case of antiseizure medications, the side effects are often additive when
combination treatments are used, leading to a larger number of side effects. This is
presumably because the therapeutic dose of each of the component drugs is above the
threshold level that causes these side effects.9
Unified combination drugs aid better compliance
Studies have shown that patients are more likely to comply with a regimen of fewer
tablets or capsules per day. °10 Unified combination therapies also reduce fixed costs,
including the cost of packaging, co-pays by the patient, and reduced number of
prescriptions, making them more economical. Furthermore, forced joint consumption
ensures that the patient cannot take only one agent of a combination therapy and thus
reduces the chance of the infectious agents acquiring serial resistance to each of the
components.
8 Albert I Wertheimer, Alan Morrison ,"Combination Drugs: Innovation in Pharmacotherapy",
Pharmacy & Therapeutics, January 2002, 27 (1) 44:49
HST Pharmacology lectures, Carl Rosow, Harvard Medical School, March 2006
10 Haynes RB,"A critical review of the determinants of patient compliance with therapeutic
regimens. Compliance with therapeutic regimens" In: Sackett DL, Haynes RB, Editors,
Compliance with therapeutic regimens, Johns Hopkins University press, 1976:26-39
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This desire for increased compliance has spawned novel ways of combining drugs to
increase compliance, including a 'polypill'- a pill with five drugs and one vitamin1. This
polypill, if taken by all adults over 55, according to certain
researchers, could potentially prevent 88% of all heart
attacks and 80% of all strokes".
In half of all cases of eye infections, a combination of
topical treatments is indicated. A combination, in this case,
is virtually a requirement due to the difficulty in applying
multiple products to the eye. 2
lU mg nopril (an Au innsD
Economic benefits of combination drugs Figure 2: The Hypothetical Pc
from Harvard Health Letter,
2004'
Unified combination drugs are often cheaper
Combination drugs are often less expensive than the sum of their constituents. Hence,
when combination drugs are unified, they are often more economical. A patient could,
for instance, save $1,080 per year if a benazepris/amlodipine combination is used rather
than the constituent calcium channel blocker and ACE inhibitor.13 A study of tuberculosis
drugs, used by a very cost sensitive population in Africa, showed that combination fixed
dose compounds had far greater annual decreases in prices than the individual
components, and in 2002, cost half as much as buying the equivalent single doses. 4
Market discrimination by firms
When combination products are sold for different indications than are the constituent
products, the firm has the ability to engage in price discrimination and increase its overall
profits. For instance, customers are usually sensitive to the prices of drugs for chronic
" "All-in one pills for heart disease", Harvard Health Letter July 2004:3
12 "Combination Drugs", Review of Optometry, August 2004;2-4
13 Kountz, D.S. "Cost Containment for Treating Hypertension in African Americans: Impact of a
Combined ACE-inhibitor/Calcium Channel Blocker". Journal of the National Medical
Asscociation 1997;89(7): 457-460
Robert Bwire, "Product costs of fixed-dose combination tablets in comparison with separate
dispensing and or co-blistering of anti-tuberculosis drugs", World Health Organization
International Publications, 2002. whqlibdoc.who. int/publications/2003/a86263_welcome.pdf
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lypill
July
indications and less so to the prices of drugs for acute indications15 . Thus, a
combination drug used for a chronic indication could be priced lower than a constituent
component used for an acute indication.
Clinical drawbacks of combination drugs
Fixed ratios
Perhaps the biggest negative feature of unified combination therapy is that these
products limit the ability of prescribing physicians to control dosage of the components. If
a particular combination is not offered, a patient may be prescribed a non optimal
combination. By targeting the"average" or "median" patient, the fixed dosages may not
be applicable to a large part of the patient population.
Adverse effects additive
In certain classes such as drugs for diseases of the central nervous system, the side
effects are additive, which means a combination produces more side effects than a
single component drug at a higher dose. This is presumably because drugs used for
central nervous system indications, such as anticonvulsants, have to be dosed above
the threshold that causes side effects in order to be effective. Thus, a combination of
drugs leads to a combination of side effects, since each of the drugs may cause different
side effects.
Prevailing negative attitude
Post World War II, many drug companies marketed effective drugs along with dubious
drugs in a unified tablet. This caused the American Medical Association to oppose fixed
dose combinations because it limited the physician's ability to decide on which
components and dosage to prescribe.7
15 Kolassa E. M ,Elements of Pharmaceutical Pricing,., The Pharmaceutical Products Press, 1997
16 "Two pills in one", Harvard Heart Letter, June 2004
17 Herxheimer, The danger of fixed drug combinations" ,international Journal of Clinical
Pharmacoloav and Biopharmacoloav 1975 12(1-2): 70-73
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This historically negative attitude has hindered the acceptance of combination products.
This is reflected in the guidelines that prescribe a less efficacious single antihypertensive
as the first line treatment for hypertension, and in the general reluctance to prescribe
unified pills.18
Economic drawbacks of combination drugs
Exclusionary bundling and patent extension
Exclusionary bundling9occurs when a pharmaceutical company has a patented product
that is often used in combination with a product that is not patented. The company may
price the unified product substantially lower than the sum of the prices of the two
component products, at which price it becomes unprofitable for competitors to offer the
non patented product alone. Additionally, the company may choose to provide only the
unified product, forcing the unprotected component to be bought from the company,
thereby further reducing competition for the unprotected component.
For example, if Pfizer produced the sole HDL-raising drug, torcetrapib, and bundled it
with its LDL-lowering drug - atorvastatin (Lipitor) - a class of products (statins) which
have recently lost patent protection2 - at a price at which it became unprofitable for
other manufacturers of statins to offer their products individually, it would result in
exclusionary bundling. This would be especially true if the standard of care for patients
with hyperlipidemia becomes a combination of HDL-raising and LDL-lowering medication
and if Pfizer did not offer the HDL-lowering drug alone as is its current intention.2
Combination therapies: Devices
Drug eluting stents are expected to capture 70% to 90% of the total market for stents.22
This is just one example of the increasing interest in drug-device combinations. The
1 8
" 'Guidelines for the Diagnosis and Management of Asthma", Expert Panel Report 2. National
Institute of Health, National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute 1997.
19 Barry Nalebuff ,"Exclusionary bundling", Yale School of Management,
www.law.yale.edu/leo/papers/nalebuffl .pdf
20 Val Brickates Kennedy ,"Pfizer: Lipitor sales won't fall off a cliff", www.MarketWatch.com, May
2, 2006
21 "'Torcetrapib and Atorvastatin",New England Journal of Medicine, October 6 2005
22 Robert Roth, Winning combination", Red Herring, Feb 2003;53-55
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table below shows drug-device products currently in development. Pharmaceutical
companies that previously exited the device business are increasingly entering joint
development agreements with medical device companies to create these combinations.
One example is the recent joint development agreement between Medtronic and
Genzyme.2 3
In the mix
Some of the newdevices making their way throughthe U.S.
Food and Drug Administration.
· Medtronic Sofamor Danek's InFuse Bone Graft/LT-CAGE fusion
device: a metallic spinal-fusion devic that combines an Inert metal
cage for stabilizatlon plus a biologically active bone graft substitute
* Ortec's OrCel bilayered cellular matrix: a wound-healing device that
incorporates living skin-regenerating cells into an inert matrix
· DePuy Orthopaedics) Prostalac: a temporary hip prosthetlc device
consisting of bone cement and antibiotics
* VitaGen's ELAD artificial iver: a liver-assist device that incorpo-
rates human iver cells into hollow fiber membranes for kidney
dialysis
* Novoste's Beta-Cath System: a cardiac catheter tube containing
radioactive seeds that provides short-term radiation treatment of
coronary arteries to prevent scar tissue from reblocking blood
passageways
SOURCE: Wirberg Group
Table 1: Combination devices, Red Herring Feb 200324
Clinical benefits of combination devices
Invasion - local treatment
One of the major benefits of using drug-device combinations is that it allows the
mechanical properties of a device to be augmented by the biologic properties of
pharmaceuticals. Drug-device combinations make the underlying mechanical procedure
far more successful, particularly in orthopedic and cardiovascular applications, where
both mechanical and biological factors are critical for success.
This can be seen in the case of drug-eluting stents, which prevent smooth muscle
proliferation on the stents, generally by coating the stents with anticancer drugs. This
23 "Devices and their desires, Engineers and Chemists get together", The Economist, April 15
2006: 65
24 Robert Roth, "Winning combination", Red Herring, Feb 2003;53-55
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inhibition of cell growth by the drug makes angioplasty far more efficacious, reducing the
need for restenting and open heart surgery.2 5 Conversely, brain electrodes would have
to elute growth factors to prevent the brain from 'growing away' from the implants, which
is the normal response of the human brain to medical implants.'6
In contrast to an oral or injected drug that acts on the whole body, the drug-device
combination ensures that the drug is localized to where the action is needed, by the
implanted device. For example in drug eluting stents, Taxol, at te site of the stent,
prevents proliferation at the location of the implant. There is currently no systemic
therapy to prevent this proliferation, presumably because the concentrations required
locally at the site of the stent cannot be achieved within the therapeutic range of any
drug given systemically. 2 7
Clinical drawbacks of combination devices
Complex interactions and regulations
The complex interactions between drugs and devices make clinical testing and approval
far more challenging than that of individual products. The drugs need to be tested for
efficacy with the device as well as for systemic toxicity. In addition, when biologic
components such as cells are used in the device, the manufacturing and quality control
can become very complex.28
Combination therapies: Diagnostic and therapy
The restriction on the use of Herceptin for breast cancer patients with a high number of
estrogen receptors ushered in the era of personalized medicine.? This, in tumrn, has
given rise to 'in-house' testing, a way for pharmaceutical firms to bundle a diagnostic or
genetic test with the treatment.
25 Pedro A. Lemos, Patrick W. Serruys, J. Eduardo Sousa, Drug-Eluting Stents Cost Versus
Clinical Benefit", Circulation. 2003;107:3003
26 Turner JN, Shain W, Szarowski DH, Andersen M, Martins S, Isaacson M, Craighead
H.,"Cerebral astrocyte response to micromachined silicon implants",Exoerimental Neurology,
1999 Mar; 156(1 ):33-49.
27 Yang Z, Birkenhauer P, Julmy F, Chickering D, Ranieri JP, Merkle HP, Luscher TF, Gander
B,"Sustained release of heparin from polymeric particles for inhibition of human vascular smooth
muscle cell proliferation", Journal of controlled release, 1999 Aug 5;60(2-3):269-77.
28 Robert Roth, 'Winning Combinations", Red Herring, Feb 2003
29 "Personalized medicine: revolutionizing drug discovery and patient care", Trends in
Biotechnology, December 2001,19
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This vertical integration of testing with treatment exemplifies efforts by the
pharmaceutical industry to avoid potential double marginalization (described in further
detail below) whereby the diagnostic supplier as well as the pharmaceutical company
attempts to extract a margin, raising the price to system wide profit reducing levels.
Merck discovered that in order to make Fosamax, a drug for osteoporosis, successful, it
had to lower the price of the diagnostics (bone scans) or suffer from double
marginalization. In this case, Merck achieved the integration contractually by promoting
products from Lunar Corp., Hologic, Inc., and Compumed.30
30 Association of Strategic Alliance Professionals, June 2003;1 ( 1), www.strategic-alliances.org
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CHAPTER 2: FACTORS AFFECTING UNIFIED COMBINATION
DRUG PRICING
Having discussed the various types of combination products and their advantages and
disadvantages I will now outline the primary factors that influence the pricing of unified
combination pharmaceutical products.
Two of these factors - market factors and component factors -- will be applicable to all
combination products and the third - market exclusivity - will be applicable to those
combination products that have a component which has some degree of exclusivity,
generally in the form of patent protection.
The pharmaceutical pricing chain
After the legislation of a most favored nation clause for the United States federal
government, whereby the government must receive the lowest price that a
pharmaceutical company has offered any purchaser, there has been a drastic reduction
in discounting by pharmaceutical companies, leading even to an increase in prices for
some generics. The political factors driving the public sector have perversely reduced
discounting in the private sector and have added to the increase in prices as had been
previously predicted by critics.3 In addition, a large fraction of the population does not
have prescription drug insurance coverage and must purchase their products at the
pharmacy at list prices. Due to these reasons, I will solely use retail prices paid by the
private sector for all analyses done in this thesis.
3' Fiona Scott Morton,"The Strategic Response by Pharmaceutical Firms to the Medicaid Most-
Favored-Customer Rules," The RAND Journal of Economics, 1997;28( 2)
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Illustration of Pricing Chains2 s
Prices indicate the amotuot typically paid or a drug with an
Avelrage 'hlolesale Pric:e (AWP) of S1.OO per tablet
I _ _ _ __I
I I
I/ WHOLESALERS ,I
"I $0.80 (WAC) |,
e, '^,
11 n r.
o 4PHARMACY 
$0.84 (EAC)
i UI-I
Figure 3: Pricing Chains from "The Profit in Pills: A Primer on Prescription Drug Prices",
American Association for Retired Persons32
Market factors in the Pharmaceutical Industry
The Elements of Pharmaceutical Pricing, by Mitch Kolassa33 lists nine primary market
factors that a pharmaceutical firm considers when deciding on the price of its product.
These are summarized below:
32 "The Profit in Pills :A Primer on Prescription Drug Prices", American Association for Retired
Persons, www.retiredamericans.org/news theprofitinpills.htm
33 Kolassa E. M, Elements of Pharmaceutical Pricing,., The Pharmaceutical Products Press, 1997
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1. Competitor prices, product features and actions: A pharmaceutical company has
to take into account the pricing by competitors as well as their actions when
deciding on its product price. In general, other things equal, later entrants into a
market price their products lower than incumbents, presumably to achieve
market penetration. In addition, different markets display varying sensitivities to
price. Based on this, a company can pursue skimming - pricing its products high
to attract high paying customers, parity, or penetration - pricing low - as pricing
strategies.34
2. Patient characteristics i.e., the economic ability of patient to bear the cost of the
treatment. Different diseases affect distinct subpopulations with varying abilities
to pay. A product for a low income subgroup will generally have to be priced
lower than one for a high income subgroup.
3. Economic value i.e., the cost-effectiveness and social value of the medication.
For example, if a product reduces hospital stays, it can be priced relatively high.
4. Prescriber decision making: Prescribers in the market for the product may
characteristically be risk averse or be more willing to experiment.
5. Disease characteristics: Patients are more willing to tolerate high prices for acute
indications than for chronic indications, where they will have to bear the price for
a longer period of time.
6. Company dynamics: The financial condition of the company and the pressure for
immediate profits will have an impact on pricing.
7. Company financial position. The ability of the company to sustain a long
campaign against incumbents with little or no profit will determine the price at
which it can enter the market. A company in a strong financial position can, for
instance, weather a price war.
8. Insurance reimbursement scenario: When insurance companies are reluctant to
add an additional drug to the formulary for the indication, firms may be required
to price the product low to gain acceptance.
9. Public policy and reaction: Pharmaceutical companies have to weigh the risk of
the government or NGOs getting involved in the pricing of highly visible drugs,
such as the pricing of drugs for AIDS. In addition if a combination drug is priced
34 Z. John Lu,William S. Comanor, Strategic Pricing of New Pharmaceuticals", The Review of
Economics and Statistics, February 1, 1998, 80( 1):108-118
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substantially lower than the components there may be a public outcry about
"unfair" high prices for the component drug despite the more complex
combination being sold cheaply.
Demand Characteristics for Pharmaceutical Products
The demand curves for drugs are relatively steep (not very price sensitive) and drop off
dramatically at market saturation. This is because there are a certain number of patients
with the disease who are mildly sensitive to price and once all the patients have access
to the drug, there is no further demand. This allows firms to keep relatively high prices,
since a drop in price will not increase volume enough to offset the losses from the lower
price. 35
P
q Q
Figure 4: Demand Characteristics for pharmaceutical products.
P = Price Q= Quantity q= number of patients with disease
35 Jayashree Watal, "Pharmaceutical Patents, Prices and Welfare Losses: Policy Options for India
Under the WTO TRIPS Agreement", The World Economy, May 2000;23: 733
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Component factors
Component factors, for the purpose of this thesis, refer to the individual market prices of
the components of a combination product. Although variable costs such as costs of
manufacturing and materials are not a large proportion of the retail price of a drug, the
prices of combination products can be expected to exhibit a relationship to the market
prices of its components. The form of this relationship is affected by a number of other
factors such as the firm's fear of cannibalization of the market for the components.
Market exclusivity factors
In the presence of market exclusivity, such as when one or more of the components of a
combination drug is patented, additional factors, termed market exclusivity factors in this
thesis, come into play.
Double Marginalization
Double marginalization occurs when the products of two non-integrated monopolies are
required to deliver a single combination product to the consumer. Each firm, being a
monopoly with market power, will price its product at a markup over its marginal cost,
resulting in the creation of two margins or what is therefore called double
marginalization".36
Consider two unrelated firms - Company A that has a monopoly on component A of a
combination drug, and another unrelated monopoly Company B that buys component A
from Company A, and adds another component that it produces to produce a final
product B. Company B then sells this combined product B to the consumer. For this
analysis, initially let us assume that the components have no separate value, i.e., they
have to be consumed together to obtain the required therapeutic effect. Let us also
assume that the demand curve for the final combination product is linear and that the
marginal costs of producing the products are negligible, i.e., the primary costs are R&D
and fixed plant costs and the variable costs are close to zero.
36 Robert Pindyck, Daniel Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, Fifth edition Prentice Hall,2001:369,392-
403, 402-403
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Figure 5: Double marginalization: MRA marginal revenue for Firm A, MRB marginal revenue for
Firm B, MC marginal cost (0), Q quantity, P price.
Let us first consider Firm A. Since Firm A is a monopoly, to maximize its profit it will sell
a quantity of products QA, at which its marginal revenue MRA is equal to its marginal cost
(0). It will price its product at a price of PA
Firm B, will in turn, take this price PA as its input price and produce the quantity of the
combined product that maximizes its profit. To do this it will set its marginal revenue
equal to its marginal cost. Since its net marginal revenue is the difference between what
it pays Firm A and what it can price the combined product in the market, its net marginal
revenue curve MRB will be twice as steep as MRA - the marginal revenue curve of Firm
A. This will result in a quantity QB being produced and sold to the market at price PB.
From the graph we can see that QB is less than QA and that PB is higher than PA.
Mathematically I will now show that QB will be one half QA and one fourth the quantity
produced in a perfectly competitive market, a market in which no producer has pricing
power.
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Let us represent the market demand curve by
P=a-bQ
where P=price, Q=quantity, a= vertical axis intercept and b=slope of the demand curve.
Perfectly Competitive Market
In the case of a perfectly competitive market, where there are no monopolies present,
marginal revenue will equal marginal cost, which in this case is zero i.e. P=O. Hence
O= a- bQ, and
Q=a/b (2.1)
Single Monopoly
$
PM
0
QM
Q
Figure 6: A single monopoly will produce quantity QM at a price of PM
In the case of a single monopoly the firm sees the aggregate market demand as its
demand. The revenue ( R ) of the monopoly is Price * Quantity
R=PQ=aQ- bQ2
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The marginal revenue can be obtained by taking the derivative of revenue with respect
to quantity
dR/dQ = a - 2bQ
The monopoly will produce a quantity of products where its marginal revenue is equal to
its marginal costs - in this case zero.
a-2bQ = 0, implying that
QM = Y2 a/b
(2.2)
Two Monopolies
Now consider two monopolies, Firm A and Firm B. The revenue R of Firm A is Price *
Quantity
R=PQ = aQ- bQ2
The marginal revenue, i.e. incremental revenue for each additional product produced
can be obtained by taking the derivative of revenue with respect to quantity.
dR/dQ = a- 2bQ.
For Firm B, its net marginal revenue will be the revenue it receives from each additional
product it sells taking into account the per unit price of its input from Firm A. It will
therefore perceive the marginal revenue curve of Firm A as its demand curve i.e. its
demand curve is
P = a - 2bQ
Its revenue R will be P*Q:
R=PQ = aQ- 2bQ.
The net marginal revenue from each additional product it sells will be the derivative of its
revenue with respect to its quantity
dR/dQ = a - 4bQ.
To maximize profits, Firm B will produce a quantity of products where the net marginal
revenue will be equal to marginal cost.
a-4bQ = 0
which implies that, for Firm B,
Q= 1 4 a/b (2.3)
Thus, when there are two separate monopolies that are required to bring a product to
market, the quantity produced will be less than that produced by a single monopoly in
control of both components. The total surplus, i.e. the profit of the two firms minus PB*QB
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plus consumer surplus - is less than the total surplus of a single monopoly - the profit
PA*QA plus consumer surplus. This total loss is marked in Figure 5. Hence, double
marginalization results in less total surplus than would occur were the two unrelated
monopolists combined into a single integrated firm.
I will now show that when the marginal cost of the two products is not zero and the
marginal cost of firm A is MCA and the marginal cost of firm B is MCB , these qualitative
results continue to be valid. The marginal revenue of the two firms remains the same,
since the demand curve is unchanged, i.e. firm B's marginal revenue curve is twice as
steep as firm A. The quantity produced by a single monopoly will be
Marginal revenue = a - 2bQ = marginal cost = MCA + MCB
Q = (a - MCA - MCB) /b (2.4)
In the case of two monopolies, the double marginalization scenario
Marginal revenue = a - 4bQ = marginal cost = MCA + MCB
Q = (a - MCA - MCa/b (2.5)
This socially undesirable outcome was first described by Augustin Cournot in 1838, in an
analysis of the market for brass that required two complementary inputs, zinc and
copper, controlled by independent monopolies. In Coumrnot's analysis, each monopolist
supplier sets his unit price according to a reaction curve that takes into account the price
set by the other input supplier resulting in double marginalization.37 This outcome will
also occur for combination therapies in which the two components are controlled by
unrelated monopolies. The elimination of double marginalization, by merger or contracts
is therefore socially desirable and has been supported by merger authorities.
Bundling
Bundling38 is the practice of selling two or more products as a single package. This is
done either as pure bundling, where the two individual products are available only in a
37 Serdar Dalkir, David Eisenstadt, Ari Gerstle and Robert T. Masson, Complementary Goods,
Monopoly vs. Monopoly Power: A Reassessment of Merger Effects", Cornell University 2002,
Unpublished
38 Robert Pindyck, Daniel Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, Fifth edition ,Prentice Hall,2001:369,392-
403, 402-403
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bundle and are not sold separately as individual products, or as mixed bundling, where
the products are available both as individual products as well as in bundled form.
Bundling is a viable option when the values of the component products to customers are
negatively correlated. This allows a firm to offer a bundle of the two products that
increases total consumption by the consumer and increases the value to the firm by
selling more of the products, for a greater total profit, than would have been sold at
individual market prices. Bundling also occurs when firms charge more for products with
large positive networks.
Bundling of consumer drugs is common, as in the case of multivitamins and cough
syrups, where bundling reduces the number of products that have to be bought by a
consumer for a particular use. In addition to this co-packaging for convenience, several
components are included in the formulation that the customer may have not have
otherwise purchased individually due to their low added utility- which is a case of
economic bundling. 39
In this study of unified combination drugs, I will analyze prices of products when firms
engage in mixed bundling, wherein the component products are available separately as
individual drugs and also together as a bundle.
Tying
Tying4° is the requirement imposed by companies that certain products must be
purchased in combination.
Tying is a frequent occurrence in the health care industry, where companies often sell a
product that requires a disposable component for each use. For example, an imaging
device that only works with disposable film from the same manufacturer will exhibit tying.
Tying allows medical device companies to charge a premium over marginal cost for the
disposables, causing heavy users to pay more while charging a low price for the core
39 David Evans, Michael Salinger,"An empirical analysis of bundling and tying: Over-the-counter
pain relief and cold medicines",CESIFO working paper no. 1297, Industrial Organization,
presented at CESIFO, July 2004
40 Robert Pindyck, Daniel Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, Fifth edition ,Prentice Hall,2001:369,392-
403, 402-403
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device, making it affordable for light users. In economic terms, this becomes a two-part
tariff. Unlike mixed bundling, where the products are available individually as well as in a
bundle, tying generally forces all products to be purchased from one seller.
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CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESES CONCERNING THE PRICING
OF UNIFIED COMBINATION DRUGS
I will now offer hypotheses concerning the relationships between the various factors that
influence the pricing of unified combination products. This relationship will be further
analyzed for two classes of unified combination drugs - those with market exclusivity
and those without.
The three factors I have discussed earlier - component factors, market factors and
exclusivity factors - will have varying influences on the price of combination drugs. The
following hypotheses will attempt to predict the influence of these factors on the price of
the unified combination product. Hypothesis 1 has a weak (la) and a stronger (b)
version. Hypothesis 2 will introduce issues concerning market exclusivity.
HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis 
la
Prices of unified combination druaqs will be positivelv correlated to the sum of the prices
of the components, despite the low marginal costs of manufacturing pharmaceuticals.
Specifically, despite the weak relationship between manufacturing cost and retail price,
firms will have to take into account cannibalization of sales of the individual products, as
well as societal scrutiny and price their combination products in relation to the prices of
the components.
lb
The price of unified combination products will be less than the sum of the prices of the
components. Although analysis of reasons for this are beyond the scope of this thesis, I
conjecture that combined products will on average be priced lower due to factors such
as savings on fixed costs and reimbursement limits. The added regulatory burden of
obtaining separate FDA approval for the combined product is a fixed cost and will not
have a strong influence on the retail price of the combination product.
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Hypothesis 2
The relationship between the sum of the price of the components and the price of the
combined product will be significantly modified by market exclusivity. Specifically, the
presence of exclusivity for any of the comDonents will decrease the Drice of the
combined product relative to the sum of the prices of its components.
For combination products with exclusive components, i.e., protected by patents, the
market exclusivity factors described above - elimination of double marginalization, tying
or bundling, including exclusionary bundling, may occur. All of these factors tend to
lower the price of the combined product in relation to a non-exclusive combination with
the same constituent costs. The price of these combination Droducts with an exclusive
component will also have a stronaer correlation with the sum of comDonent prices than
combination products without any exclusive component, i.e., component factors
dominate over other factors for exclusive products.
Prices of combination products with non-exclusive products. where there are no market
exclusivity factors at Olav. will thus have a relatively higher price when compared to
products with an exclusive component. These products will have a lower correlation with
the sum of component prices than products with an exclusive component since these
firms do not have to take into account cannibalization of a protected component drug
and will therefore be more responsive to other market forces.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODS
Sample and data sources
The list of all unified combination drugs sold in retail was obtained by running a query in
IMS Dataview4 ', selecting all products with more than one component. This list was
refined, first by only including tablets and capsules and removing other delivery
formulations such as intramuscular or intravenous. Next, drugs that did not have
separately sold individual components were removed from the list. Two web based
sources - www.Epocrates.com and www.Medicare.gov -- were used to determine
whether the components were available. The refined list consists of 35 unified
combination drugs for which data about the combined price, individual component price
and market exclusivity status are available.
Each unified combination drug was input into the Medicare website to obtain the most
common dosage used and the exclusivity status of the drug and the components. The
formulation of the unified combination drug and the prices of the individual components
were then obtained from the Epocrates website. In a few cases, the exact dosage was
not available for a component and the price from the closest dosage was used. The
individual steps followed to obtain the data are detailed in the Data Appendix. This data
was compiled on Feb 15, 2006 and reflects the retail prices and market status as of that
day; all prices are for monthly (30 day) prescriptions.
Variables
The dependent variable is the monthly price of the combined unified drug.
Explanatory variables
To understand the relationship between the sum of the prices of the components and
market exclusivity to the retail price of the combined drug, I used three explanatory
41IMS Dataview contains pricing data from a variety of sources including most pharmacies in the
United States, www.imshealth.com.
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variables - a dummy variable representing exclusivity, exclusivity times the sum of the
prices and the sum of the prices squared. Exclusivity was used as an explanatory
variable to assess whether the combination price is statistically affected by the presence
of exclusive components. Exclusivity times the sum of the prices was used to quantify
the relationship between the sum of the prices of the components and the combined
product price, for products with exclusivity. As a third explanatory variable and to avoid
complications such as perfect colinearity, I used the square of the sum of component
prices rather than the sum of component prices.
In mathematical terms, letting Pc be the price of the combined drug, P1 and P2 be the
prices of the component drugs, EX be a dummy variable equal to 1 if one of the
component drugs have exclusivity, else zero, and letting bO, bi, b2 and b3 be
parameters to be estimated empirically, the equation I specify is as follows:
Pc = bo + bl*EX + b2*EX*(P1 + P2) + b3*(P1 + P 2) 2 + e, (4.1)
where e is a random error term, assumed to be independently and identically normally
distributed with mean zero and constant variance.
Note that with this specification, the following relationships are implied:
APc/A(P1 + P2) = b2EX + 2b3*( P1 + P2) and (4.2)
APc/ZEX = b + b2*(P1 +P 2), (4.3)
where the delta symbol A refers to "change in" or "difference operator" (partial
derivatives cannot be used here since EX is a discrete rather than continuous variable).
Hypothesis testing
Hypothesis a predicts that APc/A(P + P2) will be positive. This implies that
b2EX + 2b3*(P1 + P2) > 0
For this relationship to hold for non-exclusive drugs (EX =0), the term 2b3*(P1 + P2) must
be positive implying that
b3 > 0 (4.4)
Hypothesis b predicts that the increase in price for every unit increase in the price of
the components is less than one, i.e., the combined product price rises more slowly than
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the constituent product prices (APc/A(P1 + P2) <1). Testing this hypothesis for non-
exclusive products (EX=0) implies that for this hypothesis to hold, it is necessary that
2b 3 *(P 1 + P2) < 1.
This (assuming a positive b3) cannot be true for infinitely large values of PI + P2 but for
the range of values in this dataset (max(P + P2) = 235) it implies that
2b3*( 235) < 1
b3 < 0. 0021 for max (Pi + P2) = 235 (4.5)
Hypothesis 2 predicts that component market exclusivity will reduce the price of the
combined product i.e.
APc/AEX < 0, which from Eqn. (4.3) requires that
b, + b2*(PI + P2) < 0, which implies
b2 <0 (4.6)
Additionally for APc/AEX < 0 either
bI <0 (4.7)
or if b, is positive, hypothesis 2 is true for a range where
b, >0 for b2*(P + P) > - b, (4.8)
The hypotheses concerning the pricing of combination products therefore result in the
following restrictions on the parameters I estimate:
Hypothesis tested Applicability Predictions Range
Hypothesis a general b3>0
Hypothesis b limited b3< 0.0021 max =255
Hypothesis 2 general b2< 0
general b1 < 0
limited b2*(P,+P 2) > -bl b, > 0
Table 2: Hypotheses and predictions
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Statistical analysis
The data was compiled in Excel and statistical analyses were performed using the
regression function of the Microsoft Excel data analysis package. To test the
hypotheses, I will perform the following analyses:
First, I will perform multivariable regression analysis to assess whether the explanatory
variables adequately explain variation in the dependent variable. I will test the result for
validity via the equation F-statistic, the adjusted R2and an analysis of the residuals.
The resulting equation will posit a way to derive the price of the combined product based
on exclusivity and the price of the components. In addition to the hypothesis testing
described above, to validate hypothesis 2, I will segregate the data based on market
exclusivity, and compute the correlation between these two sets of variables
(combination price and sum of prices of components) for both groups (with and without
exclusivity).
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
Statistical Results
I performed a multivariable regression analysis with the explanatory variables and
dependent variable discussed above. Below is the output from the analysis:
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.918
R Square 0.843
Adjusted R
Square 0.827
Standard Error 16.517
Observations 35.000
ANOVA
Significance
df SS MS F F
Regression 3.000 45256.768 15085.589 55.298 1.51 E-12
Residual 31.000 8456.953 272.805
Total 34.000 53713.720
Standard Upper
Coefficients Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 95%
Intercept 29.962 3.723 8.048 0.000 22.370 37.555
Exclusivity 37.833 18.331 2.064 0.047 0.446 75.220
price sum 2 0.0056 0.001 4.118 0.000 0.003 0.008
e*Sum -0.604 0.362 -1.669 0.105 -1.343 0.134
Table 3: Regression output. Dependent: price. Independent: exclusivity, square of the sum of prices
of components exclusivity times sum of prices
The equation F-test is significant at p<0.0001 indicating that variations in the explanatory
variables are significantly explaining variability in the dependent variable.
84% of the variation in the price of the combined product is explained by the variation in
the explanatory variables (R2 = 0.843 and Adjusted R2 = 0.82). The coefficient estimates
on EX (exclusivity), (PI+P2) 2 (square of total constituent price) are each statistically
significant at p<0.05, although the estimate on the exclusivity-price sum interaction
variable is not significant.
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The results of the regression are
bo= 29.962 (8.048)*
b,= 37.833 (2.064)*
b2= -0.604 (1.669)
b3= 0.0056 (4.118)*
(Note: Values in parentheses are the absolute values of the t-statistics. * denotes
significance at a 5 percent (two-tailed) level.).
The estimated equation for the least squares regression is therefore:
Pc = 29.962 + 37.83 *EX + 0.604*EX*(Pi + P2) + 0.0056*(P 1 + P2)2 (5.1)
where:
Pc is price of the combined drug,
PI and P2 are the price of the component drugs,
EX is a dummy variable equal to 1 if one of the component drugs have
exclusivity, else zero.
Below is an analysis of the delta relationships (equation 4.2 and 4.3) at the 10th
percentile rank, at the median, and at the 90th percentile rank.
Non
Pi+P 2 Exclusive Exclusive
Rank 4 (10th percentile) 14.00 0.16 -8.30
Rank 17 (median) 32.98 0.37 -19.56
Rank 32( 90thpercentile) 68.05 0.77 -40.36
Table 4:APc/A(PI + P2) relationships (equation 4.2) at various ranks
pl+P2 APc/ldEX
Rank 4 ( 1 0 th percentile) 14.00 29.37
Rank 17 (median) 32.98 17.90
Rank 32 (90thpercentile) 68.05 -3.30
Table 5: APc/AEX relationships (equation 4.3) at various ranks
From Table 4 we can see that at the 10 th percentile of the dataset (sorted by total
component price), for every $1 increase in the component price, non-exclusive products
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increase slightly by 0.16 and exclusive products decrease in price by $8.30. As the
component prices become higher the exclusive product discounting increases.
Presumably at higher prices for exclusive products the market exclusivity factors, which
would cause prices to decline, are in effect and are less so at lower prices. The non-
exclusive product price delta remains small. These results also show that the change in
component price has a much greater effect for exclusive products than for non-exclusive
products.
Table 5 also shows that as the total component price increases, the premium for
exclusive products over non-exclusive products becomes a discount. At total
component prices greater than 63.05, exclusive products have a discount and below that
a premium to the price of non-exclusive products having the same total component
costs.
Goodness of Fit
A White test yields an insignificant F-statistic (1.06, significance 0.37), allowing us to not
reject the assumption of homoskedasticity.
Below is the table of predictions along with the results obtained from the regression.
Table 6: Hypothesis predictions with computed values
Since hypothesis 1 b does not hold but hypothesis 2 does (b2 < 0) hypothesis 1 b is
applicable to exclusive drugs for a range
2b 3*(P 1 + P,) < 1- b2
i.e., where
51.61< P1+P2 < 233.05
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Hypothesis tested Applicability Predictions Range Result True/False
Hypothesis a general b 3>0 b3>0 True
max b3 >
Hypothesis lb limited b 3< 0.0021 =255 0.0021 False
Hypothesis 2 general b2< 0 b2<0 True
general b, < 0 bl>0 False
b2*(P1+P 2) > - True for
limited b, b > 0 Pi+P 2 > 63.05
Below is a plot of the relationship of combined product price to the sum of component
prices for exclusive and non-exclusive drugs based on the equation derived from the
least squares regression.
[usive
-Exclusive
63.05 Sum of components price
Figure 7: Plot of exclusive and non-exclusive combination drug price vs. sum of component price
Looking at the plots of combined product price against the sum of components price, we
see that exclusive products reveal far more correlation than non-exclusive products.
The correlation coefficient (or multiple R for a regression of price against total constituent
price) for exclusive products is 0.90 (with a significant F-statistic p<O.001), which is much
larger than the 0.19 for non-exclusive products (F-statistic not significant).
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Figure 8: Plot of price (Y) vs. sum of components total price. Non-exclusive only.
Price vs. sum of component prices - exclusive only
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Figure 9: Scatter plot of price (Y) vs. sum of components total price. Exclusive only.
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Discussion
Hypothesis a predicted that over all types of products (exclusive and non-exclusive)
unified combination prices will be lower than the sum of the prices of the constituents. In
fact, the mean price for the unified combination product was $48.90 and the mean of the
sum of the prices of the component drugs was $46.77, indicating a slight combination
premium. In addition, this difference is not statistically significant and we will have to
reject hypothesis lb since there is no empirical support for it. We cannot. however.
reject weaker hypothesis a that the unified combination product price is positively
correlated with the sum of component prices. Moreover, as discussed in the results
section above, hypothesis 1 b does hold for a range of prices for exclusive products. For
exclusive products, whose sum of component prices are between 51.61 and 233.05, the
combined product is priced at a discount to the sum of its constituents prices.
One possible reason for the above result could be that the added costs, including added
regulatory requirements for the combination product, may offset the marginal cost
reductions due to lower packaging and manufacturing costs.
This regression reveals two primary components of the price of the unified drug.
The first is $29.96 + 0.0056 (Pi + P2)2 that slowly increases with the increase of the
square of the sum of components prices. The second component is a modifier if the
drug has an exclusive component of $37.83 - 0.6 * (P1 +P2.)
The results suggest that there is relatively large exclusivity premium (-$37.83) if the
prices of the components of the drug are relatively cheap. It may be the case that, in this
scenario, the exclusive drug in a stand-alone form is sold in a highly competitive market,
which explains the low prices of the components, and the combined drug offers an
opportunity for the company to enter a less competitive and more lucrative market.
As the prices of the component drugs become higher, this premium declines and
becomes a discount at total component prices greater than $63.05. Hypothesis 2
predicted that drugs with an exclusive component will be less expensive than those
without an exclusive component. Based on the results of the least squares regression
we cannot reject hypothesis 2 for combined druas whose total component costs are
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greater than $63.05. Total component costs are above $63.05 for roughly two-thirds of
the sample analyzed. One explanation for the change from a premium to a discount for
products with an exclusive component could be that, at high component prices, the
combination product may be increasingly influenced by the market exclusivity factors of
bundling, exclusionary bundling, or elimination of double marginalization.
If both components were hitherto run by separate profit centers that sold their products
at market price, the combined product will eliminate double marginalization. This is
because in a well managed firm the transfer price of the exclusive ingredient would be
set at its marginal cost and not the monopoly price achieved for that component in its
market.42 This elimination of double marginalization would create downward pressure
on the price of the combined product. If the combined product employs economic
bundling, its price will be less than the sum of the components prices, again exerting
downward pressure on the price of the product. Exclusionary bundling also results in a
downward pressure on the combined product price, whereby the drug company is
attacking the producer of the other component in the combination, by pricing the
combination at a discount.
The prices of combination drugs with an exclusive component show a stronger
relationship with their components prices, possessing both a significant F-statistic as
well as a strong correlation coefficient, than do combination drugs without an exclusive
component. This suggests that products with exclusive components are more
influenced by component factors and products with non-exclusive components are more
influenced by other factors - presumably market factors.
The plausible reasons, described above, for a premium or discount in the pricing of
products with an exclusive component in relation to products without an exclusive
component are summarized in Figure 14 below. Since non-exclusive products are
assumed to be responding primarily to market pressures, the relative premium and
discount of exclusive product prices are posited to be due to profit-seeking entry and the
influence of market exclusivity factors.
42 Robert Pindyck, Daniel Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, Fifth edition Prentice Hall,2001:369,392-
403, 417-420
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Figure 10: Pricing of exclusive and non-exclusive products relative to prices of components with
plausible reasons for the premium and discount of exclusive products
Implications for personalized medicine
At first glance, it may seem plausible that the advent of personalized medicine might
adversely affect the economic feasibility of commercializing further unified combination
drugs, since the doses would have to be tailored for each individual. This, however, may
not be the case.
One of the major reasons for different doses having different efficacy in different
individuals has been the idiosyncratic rates of metabolism of drugs by different
individuals. This difference in metabolism can be used to broadly categorize the
individuals into slow, normal, and fast metabolizers for different drugs.43
In most cases, as in that of the gene CYP2D6 that transcribes drug metabolizing
enzymes, this happens due to gene duplication. Multiple copies result in discrete
increments in the rate of metabolism of drugs. To address this, combination drugs can
43Jan van der Weide, Linda S W Steijns, Cytochrome P450 enzyme system: genetic
polymorphisms and impact on clinical pharmacology", Annals of Clinical
Biochemistry 1999;36:722-729
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be provided in fixed doses, corresponding to the number of copies of genes, thereby
limiting the number of combinations that need to be manufactured.
Limitations
This study was conducted on a small sample from only one class of combination
products - unified combination drugs. Extrapolating these conclusions for all drug/drug,
drug/device, or drug/diagnostic combinations will have its limits.
In addition, as explained in Chapter 1, there are several prices that could be used to
conduct this study. Using wholesale prices rather than retail prices could yield different
results. Using international prices, which are very different, due to the single buyer
structure of most of those markets could also substantially change the results. The
factors analyzed in this thesis are in effect at the manufacturer level of the supply chain.
The prices used were, however, retail prices. Discrepancies in margins for exclusive
and non-exclusive products at the retail level could affect the results of this thesis.
A review of pharmacology shows that even in the case of antibiotics, the theoretical
superiority of a combination drug - producing a better result with fewer side effects - has
not been adequately demonstrated, except in cases such as tuberculosis and AIDS.
Combination drugs may, therefore, have a narrow area of applicability.
This study also has limited analysis of oncology drugs, wherein a combination is the
preferred mode of treatment. This is because, despite the widespread use of
combination therapies in oncology, there are few unified combinations available.
It is, in fact, in oncology that these hypotheses could be very interesting. Avastin, priced
at $200,000 per patient per year, may be cheaper as a component of a combination drug
if Genentech were encouraged to produce a combination. The lack of analysis of this
important class may limit the use of this study.
Future research
Expanding the study to remove the limitations mentioned above would make the
analysis and conclusions more complete. A detailed study of drug/device- and
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drug/diagnostic-pricing relationships would be most interesting. In addition, these fields
can build on previous studies done on two-sided markets, where a device could serve as
a platform for a drug.
Other related studies 4 suggest that the factors studied in this thesis also influence
combinations of two protected products. Branded-branded combination products that are
cannibalizing an existing market discount on average 5.5%, while branded-generic
combinations discount 22%. In new markets entered into by combinations, the former
discounts 2% and the latter 5%. This suggests that firms differentiate unified
combination product prices both on the market exclusivity position and their pursued
strategy, of expansion, defense, or exclusionary bundling. Incorporating data from these
studies could provide a more general conclusion.
Conclusions
Unified combination product prices are related to the market prices of their components.
The effects of component prices vary at different pricing levels and by exclusionary
status; inexpensive exclusive components lead to a more expensive combination
product, more expensive exclusive components to a relatively less expensive combined
product, while non-exclusive components lead to a slightly more expensive combined
product.
It is evident that the market exclusivity status of the drugs strongly influences the
relationship between combination product prices and the prices of their constituent
elements. For exclusive components, the relationship between component prices and
unified combination prices is very strong. For non-exclusive components, that
relationship appears to be dominated by other factors, presumably market factors. For
roughly two thirds of the products studied, exclusive products are less costly relative to
non-exclusive products with the same component costs. These results are consistent
with the hypothesis that, for this class of exclusive combination drugs, the elimination of
double marginalization by efficient transfer pricing and economic and exclusionary
44"Pricing Drivers of Combination Therapies - Product Premiums Scarcely Seen", Healthcare
reports by Data Monitor, May 2005
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bundling, lowers the price of the unified combination drug relative to the price of its
constituents.
The most compelling case made by this thesis is that, payors and policy makers should
encourage the creation of combination drugs by pharmaceutical companies that market
an expensive patented drug that is currently used in combination therapy with another
drug. The resulting combined product will most likely be less costly than the sum of
prices of the individual components.
Payors, policy-makers and practitioners should update current guidelines and make
unified combination drugs the first line of treatment for indications where combination
drugs have a higher efficacy than single drugs, such as, in the treatment of AIDS,
hypertension and cancer. This thesis shows that combined drugs are, in general, no
more expensive than the constituent drugs and have added clinical benefits such as
increased compliance.
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DATA APPENDIX
Sample data
sum unified
drug formulation comp price
DIOVAN HCT SMRY 0398 NVR hydrochlorothiazide/valsartan 64.98 59.99
HYZAAR SMRY 0595 MSD hydrochlorothiazide/losartan 73.98 62.99
BENICAR HCT SMRY 0703 SKY hydrochlorothiazide/olmesartan 62.18 58.3
AVALIDE SMRY 0599 BMP hydrochlorothiazide/irbesartan 61.98 59.99
MICARDIS HCT SMRY 0101 B.l hydrochlorothiazide/telmisartan 64.63 61.21
ATACAND HCT SMRY 1000 AZN candesartan/hydrochlorothiazide 71.98 65.11
TEVETEN HCT SMRY 1202 KOS eprosartan/hydrochlorothiazide 68.05 58.20
BENAZEPRIUHCTZ SMRY 0000 USA benazepril/hydrochlorothiazide 32.98 26.99
ENALAPRIL MAUHCTZ SMRY 0000 USA enalaprilhydrochlorothiazide 17.17 26.99
UNIRETIC SMRY 1197 SWR hydrochlorothiazide/moexipril 48.96 35.75
CAPTOPRIUHCTZ SMRY 0000 USA captoprilhydrochlorothiazide 13.49 15.00
FOSINOPRIL/HCTZ SMRY 0000 USA fosinopril/hydrochlorothiazide 38.99 27.25
ZESTORETIC SMRY 0389 AZN hydrochlorothiazide/lisinopril 19.98 39.99
LOTENSIN HCT SMRY 0594 NVR benazeprilhydrochlorothiazide 32.98 39.2
MONOPRIL HCT SMRY 0400 BMP fosinopril/hydrochlorothiazide 38.99 38.72
ACCURETIC SMRY 0300 PFZ hydrochlorothiazide/quinapril 47.98 39.89
PRINZIDE SMRY 0289 MSD hydrochlorothiazide/lisinopril 19.98 34.99
VASERETIC SMRY 0287 B5L enalaprilhydrochlorothiazide 17.17 43.04
CAPOZIDE SMRY 0186 P.H captoprilhydrochlorothiazide 23.98 34.55
CATAPRES TTS SMRY 0985 B.I clonidine transdermal 14.00 61.00
GLYBURIDE/METFORM SMRY 0000 USA glyburide/metformin 39.98 39.99
AVANDAMET SMRY 1002 GSK mefformin/rosiglitazone 164.13 95.99
GLUCOVANCE SMRY 0800 BMP glyburide/metformin 39.98 59.99
METAGLIP SMRY 1002 BMP glipizide/mefformin 43.98 27.77
BISOPROLOL FUM/HCT SMRY 0000 USA bisoprololhydrochlorothiazide 39.99 22.99
ATENOLOL/CHLORTHAL SMRY 0000 USA atenolol/chlorthalidone 27.88 10.99
ZIAC SMRY 1193 BRR bisoprolol/hydrochlorothiazide 39.99 67.83
TENORETIC SMRY 0884 AZN atenolol/chlorthalidone 22.98 44.33
TIMOLIDE SMRY 1281 MSD hydrochlorothiazide/timolol 26.98 22.00
NYSTATIN/TRIAM SMRY 0000 USA nystatinltriamcinolone 12.99 7.99
LOTRISONE SMRY 0784 KPT betamethasone/clotrimazole 18.98 61.57
PERPHENAZN/AMITRIP SMRY 0000 USA amitriptylineperphenazine 31.74 7.99
AMITRIPT/CHLORDIAZ SMRY 0000 USA amitriptyline/chlordiazepoxide 28.98 35.99
LIMBITROL DS SMRY 0685 VLT amitriptyline/chlordiazepoxide 28.98 70.99
SYMBYAX SMRY 0104 LLY fiuoxetine/olanzapine 234.99 245.78
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Data sources
1. IMS Dataview- all Combination drugs sold in Retail
2. From Medicare Part D database www.medicare.gov-most common formulation
of these drugs, retail price reported by Medicare reports and availability of
generics by Medicare.
3. From Epocrates www.Epocrates.com (used by HMS and several MD's) drug
composition, second source of retail price for formulation reported by Medicare,
price of each component of the formulation, whether other drugs are available for
the formulation.
Data gathering steps
1. Spreadsheet from IMS Dataview lists retail combination drugs sold.
2. Go to Medicare.gov and use the plan finder tool.
3. Enter that you do not have a current plan.
4. Get to the enter drugs section.
5. Enter the drugs in the spreadsheet.
6. Medicare identifies if generics are available - note in spreadsheet. Enter that you
want most common dosage.
7. Go to plan finder.
8. Get drug detail.
9. This has a retail list price.
10. Enter price into spreadsheet.
11. Go to Epocrates.com.
12. Enter each drug into Epocrates.com.
13. Get the formulation from top right.
14. Enter into spreadsheet.
15. Identify the formulation that is given by Medicare.
16. If exact not found normalize e.g. if only 90 day - * 1/3 make a note if modified.
Get the prices of each component for that formulation from Epocrates.com.
17. Make a note of it.
18. Epocrates.com will identify when there are multiple options available for each
drug. Make a note of it (1 if proprietary 0 if there are multiple manufacturers) for
each component.
19. Should match Medicare data.
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